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COMMENT

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE:
ITS HISTORY AND FUTURE TREATMENT
IN MONTANA
E. Lars Phillips*

I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, the Montana Supreme Court appeared to advocate for
the adoption of a brand new, one-size-fits-all standard for evaluating newly
discovered evidence in petitions for post-conviction relief, with a majority
of the Court signing on to Justice McKinnon’s concurring opinion in Beach
v. State (Beach II).1 The adoption of this standard would constitute a divergence from not only the governing statutory law, but also from nearly a
century of the Court’s own precedent.
In Montana, post-conviction relief is codified within Title 46, Chapter
21, of the Montana Code Annotated. The statute’s ambiguity, coupled with
the Beach II concurrence and its focus on proposing new standards of review for such claims,2 has left the future of post-conviction relief jurisprudence muddled and confused. The confusion stems from the result of applying the concurrence’s standards to timely post-conviction relief claims alleging newly discovered evidence under Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–21–102(2), the newly discovered evidence provision. Essentially, by
* E. Lars Phillips, Candidate for J.D. 2016 at the University of Montana School of Law. I wish to
thank E. Wayne Phillips for his unwavering encouragement during this new adventure. I am grateful to
the Hon. James C. Nelson and the Hon. John Warner for their advice and assistance. I also wish to thank
Professors Cynthia Ford and Melissa Hartigan, Hannah R. Seifert, and the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review for their invaluable time and effort.
1. Beach v. State (Beach II), 302 P.3d 47, 79–84 (Mont. 2013) (McKinnon, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 72 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
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advocating for a heightened standard of review,3 the concurrence’s standard
effectively reads the provision out of the statute by failing to distinguish
between timely and untimely claims. To illustrate, when a petitioner is proceeding under the newly discovered evidence provision, the central focus of
this article, the statute requires separate, consecutive showings at multiple
stages that the petitioner must meet in order to attain the relief sought. Initially, in order to bring a claim under § 46–21–102(2), a petitioner must
“allege the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if proved and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish” the petitioner’s
innocence.4 However, this section of the statute governs when a petition
may be filed,5 therefore requiring the petitioner to make an initial showing
of innocence before the district court may hold a hearing to determine the
merits of the claim. The confusion stemming from the construction of the
statute is apparent: if a petitioner has already established his evidence to the
reviewing court’s satisfaction in order to bring his claim, what purpose does
the evidentiary hearing serve to further evaluate the claim? Essentially, the
structure of the statute results in the same test being applied twice to petitioners alleging claims of newly discovered evidence. First, at the district
court’s review of the petition, when the petitioner must only allege the facts
that would establish his innocence in light of the evidence as a whole. And
second, after successfully passing over the initial threshold, at the evidentiary hearing where the petitioner must actually produce the alleged evidence, allowing the district court to once again weigh the evidence in light
of the evidence as a whole and determine whether the relief sought should
be granted. The standard to be applied to petitioners seeking to overcome
these two hurdles is the focus of this article.6
This article begins with a brief history of the treatment of newly discovered evidence in Montana. Next, it summarizes the current standards for
evaluating a petition for post-conviction relief in light of the recent decision
by the Montana Supreme Court in Beach v. State (Beach II). Further, it
addresses the potential effects of Beach II by analyzing Marble v. State;7 a
case currently awaiting review by the Court. Finally, the article recom3. Compare Crosby v. State, 139 P.3d 832, 835 (Mont. 2006); to Beach II, 302 P.3d at 84 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
4. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(2) (2013).
5. Id. at § 46–21–102.
6. In this regard, this article addresses only the missing distinction between timely and untimely
claims. There is a more subtle distinction that must be considered: whether a petitioner is proceeding
under a substantive or procedural innocence claim. That is, whether the petitioner is seeking his immediate release or some lesser form of relief (such as a new trial). In this context, the relief sought must
define the standards to be applied. On that note, this article assumes that the relief sought in a petition is
a new trial (and the standards set forth in this article should only be applied when a petitioner is seeking
relief on a level similar to that).
7. No. DA 13-0763 (Mont. filed Nov. 15, 2013).
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mends proposed standards of review for post-conviction relief, and concludes by offering a few points for further consideration of the post-conviction landscape in Montana.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE IN MONTANA
Within our judicial system, there is a presumption that each individual
has been afforded his Due Process. Due Process refers to the protections
granted the individual by the U.S. Constitution.8 Therefore, every conviction enjoys a fundamental assumption of validity grounded in the belief that
the conviction is constitutionally sound. This validity is given further support by the “societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial resources.”9 Yet, as in all things, there are instances in which this assumption has resulted in error.10
Ratified in 1972, the Montana Constitution is one of the most progressive in the nation.11 The purpose of the Montana Constitution is to provide
heightened protections above and beyond those guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. As the State’s district courts provide the initial “bite at the
apple” for post-conviction petitioners, these heightened protections should
be interpreted to encompass the post-conviction relief petitioner.
A. Emergence in Common Law
The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the issue of how newly
discovered evidence impacts a conviction in State v. Matkins,12 decided in
1912. Three years earlier, a number of colts disappeared from pasture only
to reappear five months later at a ranch “several miles away.”13 Two men,
the owner of the ranch and his employee, Matkins, were charged with grand
larceny in connection with the event. After Matkins was convicted, he attempted to show, largely through the use of affidavits, that he was factually
innocent of the crime.14
Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court noted “[a]pplications
for new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored
8. See e.g. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (providing the following examples:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Wash., 466
U.S. 668 (1984) (the right to effective assistance of counsel); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (the
right to confront adverse witnesses); Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the right to trial by jury)).
9. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).
10. See e.g. Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 108–109 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson & Swandal, JJ., dissenting).
12. 121 P. 881, 882 (Mont. 1912).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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by the courts.”15 In support of this premise, the Court listed a series of
concerns: the petitioner may be “under strong temptation to manufacture”
evidence of innocence; losing the trial “arouses [the petitioner] to the diligent activity which he should have put forth before the trial”; and the petitioner may persuade others to manufacture merely “cumulative or impeaching” evidence.16 To adequately alleviate these concerns, the Court looked to
other jurisdictions that had previously addressed the problem. In 1851, the
Supreme Court of Georgia addressed a case, Berry v. Georgia,17 in which
the individual proceeded under circumstances similar to those in Matkins.
Faced with this relatively novel procedure, the Berry Court developed a test
to evaluate the newly discovered evidence introduced by the petitioner.18
The Montana Supreme Court found Berry persuasive and held newly
discovered evidence would not warrant a new trial unless each of the following factors were met:
(1) [t]hat the evidence must have come to the knowledge of the applicant
since the trial;
(2) that it was not through want of diligence that it was not discovered earlier;
(3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a different result upon
another trial;
(4) that it is not cumulative merely—that is, does not speak as to facts in
relation to which there was evidence at the trial;
(5) that the application must be supported by the affidavit of the witness
whose evidence is alleged to have been newly discovered, or its absence accounted for; and
(6) that the evidence must not be such as will only tend to impeach the character or credit of a witness.19

However, the Court also recognized certain necessary exceptions, specifically noting the possibility of a situation in which “the cumulative evidence
may be so overwhelmingly convincing as to compel the conclusion that to
sustain the verdict would be a gross injustice.”20 The Court applied the test
in Matkins and determined the evidence amounted to merely “a clever device by which [Matkins’s associate] seeks to aid [Matkins to escape] what
appears to be a proper conviction,” and dismissed the claim.21
In 1959, the Court reaffirmed the Matkins test for evaluating newly
discovered evidence in State v. Greeno.22 Gerald Greeno had been convicted after his brand was found on eight steers identified as belonging to a
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 885.
Id.
10 Ga. 511 (Ga. 1851).
Id.
Matkins, 121 P. at 885 (citing Berry, 10 Ga. at 511).
Id.
Id. at 886.
342 P.2d 1052, 1055–1056 (Mont. 1959).
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Mr. Miller.23 Greeno was proceeding under a provision of the Revised Code
of Montana (1947) that governed when a new trial may be granted and
stated, in relevant part:
7. When new evidence is discovered material to the defendant and which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial. When a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing, in support thereof,
the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be
given, and if time is required by the defendant to procure such affidavits, the
court may postpone the hearing of the motion for such length of time as,
under all the circumstances of the case, may seem reasonable.24

In essence, this provision had codified the theory recognized in Matkins
roughly four decades earlier.25 Further, the Court noted that the test had
been consistently applied in at least five other proceedings in Montana:26
State v. Belland27 in 1921, State v. Mott28 and State v. Gangner29 in 1925,
State v. Hamilton30 in 1930, and State v. Curtiss31 in 1943.
B. Legislative Recognition of, and Remedy for, Error in Convictions
In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Fay v. Noia.32 Implicit in
this decision was an opportunity for the states to play a larger role in postconviction relief. The Supreme Court stated “we think that comity demands
that the state courts, under whose process [the petitioner] is held, and which
are, equally with the Federal courts, charged with the duty of protecting the
accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional rights, should be appealed to
in the first instance.”33 Effectively, Fay allowed states to create procedures
for processing claims of error that arise after a conviction became final.
23. Id. at 1052–1053.
24. Id. at 1055 (quoting Rev. Codes of Mont. 1947 § 94–7603).
25. At first blush, one may argue Greeno is distinguishable from post-conviction relief because the
Court referred to the avenue under which Greeno proceeded as a “motion for a new trial.” Greeno, 342
P.2d at 1055. However, this would completely ignore the fact that the statute at issue, listed above, is the
historical version of the modern post-conviction relief statute. Further, the Court has routinely conflated
the two modes of procedure, clearly indicating a willingness to pull from one area of jurisprudence to
interpret the other. See State v. Hatfield, 888 P.2d 899, 903 (Mont. 1995).
26. Greeno, 342 P.2d at 1056.
27. 197 P. 841 (Mont. 1921).
28. 233 P. 602 (Mont. 1925).
29. 235 P. 703 (Mont. 1925).
30. 287 P. 933 (Mont. 1930).
31. 135 P.2d 361 (Mont. 1943).
32. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. Id. at 418–419.
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1. Original Version: Chapter 26, Title 95 of the Laws of Montana
In 1967, the Montana Legislature passed a series of laws that guaranteed the availability of certain post-conviction avenues to petitioners convicted of a crime, including the Post-Conviction Hearing.34 The Post-Conviction Hearing statute provided detailed guidance to the courts regarding
the treatment of petitions seeking “to vacate, set aside, or correct [a petitioner’s] sentence.”35 Further, the law contained several notable provisions.
First, it explicitly stated the petition was required only to “identify the proceedings in which the petitioner was convicted, give date of the rendition of
the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the alleged violation
or violations.”36 Second, the law allowed for a petition to be filed “at any
time after conviction.”37 Finally and most importantly, to address the action
of the court when considering a petition of such nature, it stated: “Unless
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issue and make findings of fact and conclusions with
respect thereto.”38 Read in concert, the provisions presented a very low bar
for petitioners who sought to challenge the validity of their conviction. Further, once a hearing was held, the law specifically required certain actions
by the reviewing court:
If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order
with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such
supplementary orders as to reassignment, re-trial, custody, bail or discharge as
may be necessary and proper. If the court finds for the state, the petitioner
shall be returned to the custody of the person to whom the writ was directed.39

2. Introduction of the Procedural Bar
In 1980, the Montana Supreme Court decided In re McNair,40 which
fundamentally altered the landscape of post-conviction relief. The central
issue in McNair was the passage of time––eight and a half years––between
the sentence becoming final and the petitioner filing for post-conviction relief.41 The Court relied on two arguments to support the denial of the petition: first, the existence of a “[l]ong delay [between conviction and the peti34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

1967 Mont. Laws 458–460.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
615 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1980).
Id. at 917.
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tion] may raise a question of good faith”;42 and second, the passage of time
was insurmountably prejudicial to the State’s ability to try a case.43 In 1981,
apparently attempting to balance the potency of the concerns the Court had
raised in McNair with the opportunity created by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Fay, the Legislature amended Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102.44
The amendment changed the amount of time in which a petitioner could file
for post-conviction relief from any time after conviction to “within 5 years
of the date of conviction.”45 However, even after the imposition of this new
procedural bar, the Montana Supreme Court continued to consistently apply
the Greeno test (first adopted in Matkins) to petitions for post-conviction
relief that alleged newly discovered evidence in cases, such as In re
J.R.T.,46 decided in 1993.
3. Introduction of the Evidentiary Bar
In 1997, citing similar changes in federal law, the Legislature approved two changes to Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102.47 First, the
new version allowed petitions seeking to “vacate, set aside, or correct [a]
sentence,”48 to be filed “at any time within [one] year” of the conviction
becoming “final.”49 Second, the statute was changed to allow claims alleging newly discovered evidence to be brought “within [one] year of the date
on which the conviction becomes final or the date on which the petitioner
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of evidence,
whichever is later,” as long as the evidence, when “proved and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole would establish the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted.”50
This amendment created two types of claims under the statute: those
proceeding within a year of the conviction becoming final51 and those proceeding within a year of the discovery of new evidence.52 Notably, this was
the first amendment, since the statute was passed in 1967, which created an
additional hurdle over which certain petitioners must cross before receiving
a hearing on the merits of their claim. This unprecedented hurdle, formed
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
2255 as
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 918 (quoting U.S. v. Bostic, 206 F. Supp. 855 (D.D.C. 1962)).
Id. at 918.
1981 Mont. Laws 270–272.
Id.
853 P.2d 710, 711 (Mont. 1993).
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102 (2013) (including commission comments that cite 28 U.S.C.
the source and Fay as the impetus for the addition).
Id. at § 46–21–101(1).
Id. at § 46–21–102(1).
Id. at § 46–21–102(2) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 46–21–102(1).
Id. at § 46–21–102(2).
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by the requirement that petitioners “establish” elements of their claims in
the pleading stage, would prove to be notoriously hard to navigate for both
the courts and practitioners. As noted, however, this hurdle does not affect
every post-conviction relief petition. As explicitly stated in the statute, if the
newly discovered evidence is presented in a petition filed within one year of
the judgment becoming final, the petitioner does not face the added burden
of initially “establish[ing]” his innocence of the crime.53
While the 1997 amendment substantively changed the statute, the
Montana Supreme Court remained remarkably steady in its application of
the Greeno test. The following cases illustrate the Court’s consistent holdings that if the newly discovered evidence in a petition for post-conviction
relief passed the Greeno test, the petitioner had sufficiently “established”
his innocence to proceed to the post-conviction hearing. In State v. Clark,54
decided in 2005, the Court noted “innumerable alterations” to the Berry test
that had occurred since its adoption in Montana, “usually with little or no
rationale or explanation for the differing versions,” and restated the test to
establish a “cogent rationale.”55 In February of 2003, Kelly Clark was convicted of sexual assault.56 After the victim partially recanted her trial testimony, upon which Clark’s conviction largely rested, Clark moved for a new
trial submitting the recantation as newly discovered evidence.57 On appeal,
the Court was forced to determine whether the district court erred when
“denying Clark’s motion for a new trial after [the victim] recanted her testimony.”58 The Court, “in an effort to establish a clearer test with a cogent
rationale,” reformed the Greeno test into the following:
To prevail on a motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must satisfy a five-part test:
(1) The evidence must have been discovered since the defendant’s trial;
(2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the result of a lack
of diligence on the defendant’s part;
(3) the evidence must be material to the issues at trial;
(4) the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and
(5) the evidence must indicate that a new trial has a reasonable probability of
resulting in a different outcome.59

The Court explained the fifth factor would likely prove “to be the crux of
any district court’s evaluation of new trial motions based on new evidence.”60 Further, the Court noted “ ‘reasonable probability’ is somewhere
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102.
125 P.3d 1099 (Mont. 2005).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1100–1101.
Id. at 1101–1102.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1105.
Clark, 125 P.3d at 1106.
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between the Larrison61 test’s ‘might have reached a different conclusion’
and Berry’s ‘probably produce a different verdict’ standard.”62 Importantly,
the Court stated “a 51 percent or greater chance of producing [a] different
verdict” was “too restrictive,” and advocated for the “reasonable probability
standard” because it allowed the reviewing court to determine the “weight
and credibility of the new evidence, and to consider what impact, looking
prospectively at a new trial with a new jury, this evidence may have on that
new jury.”63
One year later, the Court affirmed the application of the newly minted
Clark test to a petition for post-conviction relief under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) in Crosby v. State.64 In Crosby, the Court stated
that while in Clark the test was applied to a motion for a new trial, the
Court “deem[ed] it appropriate to apply the same ‘newly discovered evidence’ test” in post-conviction relief.65 The Court reaffirmed the requirement that the reviewing court determine only “whether a new trial would
have the reasonable probability of resulting in a different outcome,” and
overturned the denial of Crosby’s petition because the district court had
“violated [the Clark test] when it first determined the ultimate veracity of
the recanting testimony, and then used that determination as the sole basis
to deny postconviction relief.”66
By the beginning of the 21st century, the consistent treatment of newly
discovered evidence that challenged an original conviction had created a
strong, and reliable, post-conviction relief jurisprudence in Montana. As described above, the Court had a long history of applying what became the
Clark test to petitions for post-conviction relief alleging newly discovered
evidence to determine whether the contents of the petition warranted the
relief sought.
III. THE SAGA

OF

BARRY BEACH

In an abrupt departure from the line of reasoning developed in
Matkins, Greeno, and Crosby, the Montana Supreme Court recently advocated for the adoption of the evidentiary standards found in federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence when evaluating newly discovered evidence in petitions under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–101.67 This section briefly
recounts the history behind Beach v. State (Beach II), summarizes the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Larrison v. U.S., 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
Clark, 125 P.3d at 1106 (citing Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87; Berry, 10 Ga. at 527).
Id.
139 P.3d 832, 835 (Mont. 2006).
Crosby, 139 P.3d at 835.
Id. at 835–836 (emphasis in original).
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 79–84.
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Court’s decision in Beach II, and concludes by analyzing the potential effect of the Beach II concurrence.
A. The History
In June of 1979, the body of Kimberly Nees was found near Poplar,
Montana.68 Four years later, on January 4, 1983, twenty-year-old Barry
Beach was taken into custody by the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office in
Louisiana and charged with “contributing to the delinquency of minors.”69
Three days later, he confessed to murdering Kimberly Nees.70 He confessed
again the next day in the presence of counsel as well as two Sheriff’s department personnel.71 Subsequently, in April of 1984, almost five years after the body of Kimberly Nees was discovered, a jury found Beach guilty of
deliberate homicide.72 On initial appeal, Beach argued the State failed to
prove his confession was made voluntarily.73 The Court held, because the
case was “one where the resolution of the voluntariness issue [turned] on
the credibility of witnesses,” it was required to “ ‘defer to the district judge
who [was] in a superior position to judge the credibility of [the witnesses].’ ”74 Beach’s confession proved to be the determining factor in the
case; the concurring opinion of Justice Sheehy, which, in its entirety, read
simply: “I agree with the result. The question of voluntariness is ended in
the fact Beach confessed in the presence of his attorney. All other issues
fade in that fact.”75 In spite of the Court’s confidence, however, litigation
concerning Mr. Beach’s innocence has continued for over thirty years.76
B. Beach I & Beach II
On January 18, 2008, Beach filed a petition for post-conviction relief
alleging newly discovered evidence.77 Beach argued his petition was timely
under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) because he had discovered
the “majority” of the new evidence “on or after January 19, 2007.”78 The
district court brusquely dismissed the claim as “procedurally and time
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
0244).
78.

State v. Beach (Beach), 705 P.2d 94, 97 (Mont. 1985).
Id. at 98.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 106.
Beach, 705 P.2d at 106 (citing State v. Camitsch, 626 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Mont. 1981)).
Id. at 108 (Sheehy, J., concurring).
See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, State v. Beach (Mont. Oct. 23, 2004) (No. DC 11-0723).
Appellant’s Br., State v. Beach, 2008 WL 2791289 at *8 (Mont. July 10, 2008) (No. DA 08Id.
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barred.”79 Beach appealed and in November of 2009, after reviewing the
district court’s “skeletal” order denying post-conviction relief, the Montana
Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration.80 The determination of two issues by the Court was crucial to the ensuing treatment of
Beach’s petition. First, the Court determined Beach’s petition was timebarred.81 In support of this determination, the Court explained that the
“1997 amendments [to Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102, under
which Beach was proceeding,] appl[ied] only to those convictions that became final 12 months before the effective date of April 24, 1997.”82 In
contrast to proceeding under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2),
which, at that time, required only that a petitioner satisfy the Clark test,83
the Court held, in order to proceed under a time-barred petition, the petitioner must show “strict enforcement [of the statutory bar] would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”84
The nature of his petition placed Beach in a unique position in an already unique field of law. Had the petition been timely filed, the Court
could have applied the Clark test to determine whether the newly discovered evidence warranted the relief sought, as it had recently done in
Crosby.85 By filing outside of the statutorily prescribed time limit, Beach
faced a necessarily strict standard of review. The specters of “good faith”
and “prejudice” to the state—first considered by the Court one-hundred
years earlier in Matkins—combined with In re McNair—where the Court
allowed post-conviction relief petitions to be procedurally barred by the
passage of time86—to require the Court to create a heightened barrier to
relief in the form of a hybrid Clark test.87 By creating this test, the Court
allowed Beach to have his claim evaluated at a post-conviction hearing, as
required by statute, while compensating for his unique position.88
The development of the hybrid test itself presents the second important
issue in Beach I. To determine whether Beach’s newly discovered evidence
satisfied the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception,” the Court instructed the district court to “apply a modified version of the five-prong
Clark test and the [Schlup v. Delo89] ‘clear and convincing’ standard” to
79. Beach v. State (Beach I), 220 P.3d 667, 669 (Mont. 2009).
80. Id. at 674–675.
81. Id. at 671.
82. Id. at 670.
83. Crosby, 139 P.3d at 834–836.
84. Beach I, 220 P.3d at 670 (citing State v. Redcrow, 980 P.2d 622, 627 (Mont. 1999); State v.
Pope, 80 P.3d 1232, 1242–1244 (Mont. 2003)).
85. Crosby, 139 P.3d at 834–835.
86. In re McNair, 615 P.2d at 918–920.
87. Beach I, 220 P.3d at 672–673.
88. Id. at 672–674.
89. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
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determine if “a ‘jury could find, in light of newly discovered evidence,’ that
Beach actually is innocent of his crime.”90
Essentially, the Court used the heightened ‘clear and convincing’ standard from Schlup as the remedy for whatever prejudice the State might face
should the relief be granted and the case proceed to a new trial. This implies
that, if Beach was before the Court on a timely petition, he would necessarily be subject to a lower evidentiary bar. After a post-conviction hearing
that lasted three days, the district court determined newly discovered evidence presented in Beach’s petition warranted the relief sought and released
Beach pending a new trial.91 However, before the trial could occur, the
State appealed and, for the second time in less than five years, the saga of
Barry Beach came before the Montana Supreme Court.92
The sole issue on appeal was the validity of the district court’s conclusion that the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing was sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial.93 Initially, the Court reaffirmed the
application of the Clark test as “the usual framework [for determining]
whether ‘newly discovered evidence’ warranted a new trial.”94 Further, the
Court affirmed that, because Beach filed “beyond the statutory time bar,”
the Clark test was not appropriate and the application of a hybrid test developed in Beach I was required.95 After a lengthy review of the record, the
Court reversed the district court’s order granting a new trial, dismissed the
case, and remanded Beach back into the custody of the State.96
Under the majority’s decision in Beach II, two things are clear. First,
the hybrid test from Beach I and the clear and convincing standard present
the appropriate threshold for evaluating newly discovered evidence contained in petitions filed outside of the statutorily allowed timeframe. Second, a standard less than clear and convincing would necessarily be applied
to claims that proceed in a timely manner.
C. The Beach II Concurrence
Justice McKinnon authored the concurrence in Beach II with the specific goal of “[setting] forth what in [her] view [were] the correct legal
principles that should apply in future [post-conviction relief] cases.”97 Normally, a concurring opinion serves only to illustrate a different path taken to
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Beach I, 220 P.3d at 674–675 (citing Redcrow, 980 P.2d at 628).
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 52 (citing Beach I, 220 P.3d at 672).
Id.
Id. at 71.
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 77 (McKinnon, Baker, Rice & Simonton, JJ., concurring).
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the Court’s result. In Beach II, however, Justices Baker and Rice, along
with district court Judge Simonton, who sat for Chief Justice McGrath,
signed on to the concurrence,98 adding greatly to the persuasive weight of
the opinion.
Justice McKinnon recognized the Court had applied the Clark test in
Crosby to “a timely petition filed under [Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–21–102(2)],” but, citing her previous analysis of “actual innocence,”
she found the Clark test was at odds with the statute.99 Justice McKinnon
grounded the argument for the abandonment of the Clark test in four separate propositions. First, Justice McKinnon found there was no new trial
guarantee in § 46–21–102(2),100 which rendered the Clark test inapplicable
because the Clark test factors “bear [instead] on whether a new trial should
be granted under § 46–16–702 . . . (the ‘new trial’ statute).”101 Second,
Justice McKinnon found the language of § 46–21–102(2), specifically the
word “establish,” required the application of a more stringent standard of
review than was required by the Clark test.102 She argued: “The Clark test
. . . requires only a reasonable probability that a new trial will result in a
different outcome; § 46–21–102(2) . . . , conversely, requires the petitioner’s evidence to ‘establish’ he did not engage in the criminal conduct
for which he was convicted.”103 Third, Justice McKinnon found the Clark
test required a different level of diligence than § 46–21–102(2).104 She argued:
The Clark test requires the court to assess the defendant’s diligence;
§ 46–21–102(2) . . . , however, has its own diligence standard: the petition is
timely if it is filed within one year of the date on which the conviction became
final or the date on which the petitioner discovered, or reasonably should have
discovered, the existence of the evidence, whichever is later.105

Fourth, and finally, Justice McKinnon argued the Clark test had a different standard for what constitutes newly discovered evidence.106 In particular, she noted: “The Clark test requires the evidence to be material to the
issues at trial and not cumulative or merely impeaching; § 46–21–102(2)
. . . states no such criteria.”107 Justice McKinnon’s reasons for abandoning
the Clark test in future cases evaluating post-conviction relief petitions al98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 83.
Id. at 83–84.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id.
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leging newly discovered evidence may be subjected to pointed challenges.
The following sections briefly offer criticism on each point.
1. No New Trial Guarantee
Justice McKinnon argued the lack of a new trial provision in Montana
Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) requires a different test than the Clark test
because the test was used to evaluate motions for new trial not petitions for
post-conviction relief.108 Section 46–21–102(2) “says nothing about a new
trial”109 because the provision addresses “when a petition may be filed.”110
The provision declaring what relief may be granted is § 46–21–201, which
states: “If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings
and any supplementary orders as to reassignment, retrial, custody, bail, or
discharge that may be necessary and proper.”111 Further, in Crosby, and
Beach I, the Court explicitly held the test applicable in either situation.112
Therefore, rejecting the use of the Clark test to evaluate petitions for
post-conviction relief based solely on the grounds that Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) does not contain a provision granting a new trial is
an error. This argument illustrates the problems with adopting a one-sizefits-all standard in post-conviction relief. Clearly, Justice McKinnon correctly argues that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and filed “within 30 days” of a verdict, as allowed by Montana Code
Annotated § 46–16–702, is not identical to a motion for a new trial based
on the same grounds but proceeding at some point after the thirty day deadline. This does not mean, however, that the Clark test should be completely
disregarded. Rather, as is shown later, the fifth element of the Clark test,
which contains the standard of proof to be met, should vary depending upon
the situation in which it is applied.
2. The Definition of “Establish”
Justice McKinnon’s second reason for rejecting the Clark test assumes
the word “establish,” as found in Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–21–102(2), creates a higher burden of proof than is required by the
Clark test.113 Justice McKinnon argues that “to establish innocence” means
to “affirmatively and unquestionably” prove the petitioner is not guilty of
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 83.
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 83.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102 (emphasis added).
Id. at § 46–21–201(6) (emphasis added).
Crosby, 139 P.3d at 835; Beach I, 220 P.3d at 673.
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 83 (McKinnon, Baker, Rice & Simonton, JJ., concurring).
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the crime charged.114 To adopt Justice McKinnon’s definition of “establish”
would require a petitioner to prove, “affirmatively and unquestionably,”115
that he is innocent of the crime charged, while the trial court simultaneously
determines whether the petitioner can bring his claim in the first place.
Carrying the application of this standard out to its conclusion illustrates the flaw in the underlying argument. It is illogical to require a petitioner to prematurely establish his innocence by such a high standard to
then only have him sent back before a jury at a new trial. If the reviewing
court has actually been convinced that a petitioner has affirmatively and
unquestionably proven he is innocent, the only logical result would be his
immediate release. While this standard may be appropriate for post-conviction petitions where the petitioner is seeking his immediate release, it is not
appropriate for petitioners seeking only to challenge their conviction by
more procedural means, for example: a new trial. This illustrates the central
issue of applying a one-size-fits-all standard to petitions for post-conviction
relief. When the reviewing courts are forced to treat every petition the same
regardless of the relief sought, the petitioner seeking immediate release will
necessarily be subject to the same standard of review as petitioners seeking
to demonstrate their innocence at a new trial.
3. The Level of Diligence Required
Justice McKinnon’s third reason for rejecting the Clark test, that the
test requires a different level of diligence than § 46–21–102(2),116 is a distinction without consequence. Statutorily, a post-conviction relief petition
may only be subject to evaluation under the Clark test when it is filed
within one year of the discovery of new evidence. In other words, an evaluation under the Clark test only occurs when the petition is found to be
appropriately before the reviewing court. In this instance, that requires that
the petitioner has filed his petition within one year of the discovery of new
evidence. Therefore, the fact that the Clark test states that the evidence
“must have been discovered since trial” instead of mirroring the statutory
language requiring the petition to be filed within “one year of the discovery
of new evidence,” is a distinction without a difference as the Clark test is
only applied after the reviewing court has determined that the petitioner has
filed his claim within one year of the discovery of new evidence.

114. Id. at 84.
115. Id.
116. Beach II, 302 P.3d at 83–84 (McKinnon, Baker, Rice & Simonton, JJ., concurring).
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4. The Definition of “Newly Discovered Evidence”
Justice McKinnon argued the Clark test had a different standard for
what constitutes newly discovered evidence when compared with Montana
Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2), which meant the two were incompatible.117 Justice McKinnon noted that, unlike the Clark test, § 46–21–102(2)
states no explicit criteria requiring that the evidence “be material to the
issues at trial and not cumulative or merely impeaching.”118 The statute
does, however, require that the reviewing court determine whether the alleged evidence, “if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,”
would establish innocence.119 The Clark test adequately addresses the requirement that the reviewing court consider the newly discovered evidence
along with the evidence as a whole by requiring that the new evidence “be
neither cumulative nor merely impeaching.”120 Therefore, the Clark test is
well tailored to the statute. Further, in this area in particular, the Clark test
provides much needed guidance to courts faced with determining the merits
of post-conviction relief petitions.
Each reason proposed by Justice McKinnon as justification for the
abandonment of the Clark test fails to hold up under scrutiny. Further, as
illustrated in Part II of this paper, the application of the Clark test and its
predecessors is well documented in decisions by the Court. In Certain v.
Tonn,121 the Court held, while “stare decisis is not a rigid doctrine that
forecloses the reexamination of cases when necessary, ‘weighty considerations underlie the principle that the courts should not lightly overrule past
decisions.’ ”122 Notably, the Court stated in the same decision that when
“[f]aced with viable alternatives, stare decisis provides the ‘preferred
course.’ ”123 In Payne v. Tennessee, which the Court looked to as authority
in Certain,124 the U.S. Supreme Court suggested factors such as the promotion of “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,” the fostering of “reliance on judicial decisions,” and the contribution “to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” all of
which reinforce the idea that courts should be very wary when overruling
precedent.125
117. Id. at 84.
118. Id.
119. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(2).
120. Clark, 125 P.3d at 1105.
121. 220 P.3d 384 (Mont. 2009).
122. Id. at 387.
123. Id. at 387 (citing State v. Kirkbride, 185 P.3d 340, 343 (Mont. 2008) (quoting Payne v. Tenn.,
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
124. 220 P.3d at 387.
125. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
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The infirmities within Justice McKinnon’s arguments for abandoning
the Clark test, coupled the Court’s inability to avoid overruling almost one
hundred years of precedent, show that the Court should affirm Crosby and
apply the Clark test in future cases involving timely petitions for newly
discovered evidence.
D. Proposed Reliance on Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence
One additional aspect of the concurrence warrants a brief review. In
her analysis, Justice McKinnon argued petitions proceeding under Montana
Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) should be evaluated under the standards
used to evaluate federal habeas corpus claims.126 This section briefly
presents an overview of the federal habeas corpus jurisprudence at issue
while emphasizing the distinction between a petition for post-conviction relief and the writ of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus is separate and distinct from the petition for
post-conviction relief under § 46–21–101. While the statute allows claims
that could proceed under the writ to do so,127 the fundamental nature of the
two modes of procedure are different enough to make standards applied to
one distinguishable when applied to the other. In Montana, the writ of
habeas corpus is designed to challenge the unjust incarceration of an individual.128 Conversely, the petition for post-conviction relief is designed to
challenge the validity of the conviction.129 Simply put: in Montana, the factual or legal innocence of the individual is not at issue in a habeas proceeding. Even if the Court found these two modes similar enough to warrant the
application of the same standards of review, an analysis of Herrera shows it
is not the proper case from which to draw those standards. Further, even if
U.S. Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence did provide the proper foundation
for evaluating petitions for post-conviction relief, the Court has clearly distinguished the standards to be applied in legal claims of innocence, referred
to as procedural innocence, and standards to be applied when the factual,
also referred to as substantive, innocence of a petitioner is at issue. Similar
to the distinction between post-conviction relief and habeas corpus, claims
alleging procedural or legal innocence require different standards of review.
In the context of Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–101, every claim
for newly discovered evidence implies one or both of the underlying constitutional violations recognized by American jurisprudence: (1) the hybrid
Eighth and Fourteenth amendment violation where the incarceration of an
126.
added).
127.
128.
129.

Beach II, 302 P.3d at 84 (McKinnon, Baker, Rice & Simonton, JJ., concurring) (emphasis
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–101.
Id. at § 46–22–101.
Id. at § 46–21–101.
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individual amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because the individual
is factually innocent of the crime charged; or (2) through the 14th amendment, any one of the recognized violations where the incarceration of an
individual is unconstitutional because of a violation of the defendants constitutional rights that occurred at trial.130 These two underlying violations
create two different forms of innocence: substantive innocence, where a
person is innocent of the crime charged as a matter of fact; and procedural
innocence, where a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights has occurred at trial. The distinction here is critical: a person who proves his substantive innocence is entitled to walk free because keeping a person whom
the Court has found to be substantively innocent of the crime charged
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Importantly, the Montana
statute grants the reviewing court the power to issue any supplementary
orders that are necessary and proper, including discharge of the petitioner,
as shown above.131 Procedural innocence, on the other hand, requires no
such relief, instead where a procedural violation of a petitioner’s rights has
occurred at trial, he is necessarily entitled to other forms of relief as granted
by the statute, including a new trial.132
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the distinction between procedural
and substantive innocence in Schlup v. Delo, where the petitioner was proceeding under a procedural innocence claim.133 While Schlup is similar to
Herrera in that both cases dealt with second, successive federal habeas petitions,134 the distinction between the type of innocence claimed clearly separates the two cases. Schlup’s claim of innocence was “procedural, rather
than substantive” because, unlike Herrera, where the claim at issue was
based on the theory “that the execution of an innocent person would violate
the Eighth Amendment,” Schlup’s claim was based, “not on his innocence,
but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel . . . and
the withholding of evidence by the prosecution . . . denied him the full
panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.”135 Further, the Court noted two distinctions between procedural and
substantive innocence. First, a procedural innocence claim “does not by it130. See Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (constitutional violation based on the prosecutions failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (constitutional violation of the right to assistance of counsel); Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (constitutional violation of the right to jury trial); Strickland,
466 U.S. 668 (constitutional violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel); Coy, 487 U.S. 1012
(constitutional violation involving the right to confront adverse witnesses); Taylor v. Ill., 484 U.S. 400
(1988) (constitutional violation involving the right to compulsory process).
131. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–201(6).
132. Id. at § 46–21–201(6).
133. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 313–314.
134. Id. at 301; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393.
135. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314 (internal citations omitted).
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self provide a basis for relief.”136 In that light, Schlup’s claim of innocence
was “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which
[he was required to pass] to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits.”137 Therefore, Schlup’s claim for relief rested “on
the validity of his [underlying constitutional claims].”138 Because Schlup’s
claim was brought in concert with “an assertion of constitutional error at
trial,” the Court stated that “Schlup’s conviction may not be entitled to the
same degree of respect as [Herrera’s].”139 For this reason, the Court held
that “Schlup’s evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden,” and required that “the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to
justify the conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice
unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.”140 Conversely, the
Court noted that “In Herrera (on the assumption that petitioner’s claim was,
in principle, legally well founded), the evidence of innocence would have
had to be strong enough to make his execution ‘constitutionally intolerable’
even if his conviction was the product of a fair trial.”141 Distinguishing between these two types of innocence illustrates the problem with a one-sizefits-all standard of evidentiary review for all post-conviction claims in
Montana.
To reiterate, such a one-size-fits-all approach was proposed by the
concurring opinion in Beach II, where Justice McKinnon stated, “Based on
the statute’s language, it appears § 46–21–102(2) . . . is effectively––though
perhaps not intentionally––a codification of the substantive/freestanding
claim”142 recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Herrera and in House v.
Bell.143 First, in making this assumption, Justice McKinnon advocated for
the adoption of federal habeas standards when evaluating state petitions for
post-conviction relief. More importantly, however, this standard defines all
claims under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2) as “substantive”
innocence claims. In reality, a petitioner is far more likely to proceed under
a procedural innocence claim, such as ineffective assistance of counsel,
when proceeding under a statute designed to correct errors of fact in the
original conviction.
Further, the argument that the statute is a codification of Herrera fails
to take into account the unique nature of that case in particular. To illus136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
added).
143.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.
Beach II, 302 P.3d at 84 (McKinnon, Baker, Rice & Simonton, JJ., concurring) (emphasis
547 U.S. 518 (2006).
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trate, Herrera was attempting to prove, in federal court, that he was actually
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted.144 This requires, procedurally, that he had already exhausted that particular claim in state court.
The Herrera standard, requiring a petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence, is so strict because he has already unsuccessfully attempted to
prove his actual innocence before the state courts. Further, this is precisely
why it is unlikely that relief will ever be granted under the Herrera standard: if the petitioner was actually innocent, the state court would have
already released him.
To summarize, a post-conviction relief petitioner alleging newly discovered evidence is, by the very nature of the proceeding, attempting to
correct errors of fact in the underlying conviction. As illustrated in Herrera,
this is not at issue in a federal habeas proceeding.145 Further, a petition for
post-conviction relief in Montana is not grounded in the U.S. Constitution,
but in Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–101. As noted by the Court in
Herrera, the “historic capacity” of the habeas proceeding in federal court is
to “assure that the habeas petitioner is not being held in violation of his or
her federal constitutional rights.”146 In light of this, the merits of the petition for post-conviction relief alleging newly discovered evidence should be
determined without resorting to a misplaced reliance on federal habeas jurisprudence and it defies reason to believe the standards developed in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence could adequately serve to determine the
merits of a petition for post-conviction relief in state court.
Even if federal habeas jurisprudence did provide the appropriate foundations for determining the merits of post-conviction relief claims, the distinction between the standards found in Herrera and Schlup shows that a
one-size-fits-all standard fails to take into account one of the defining characteristics of post-conviction relief claims: the relief sought. As the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
If there were no question about the fairness of the criminal trial, a Herreratype claim would have to fail unless the federal habeas court is itself convinced that those new facts unquestionably establish Schlup’s innocence. On
the other hand, if the habeas court were merely convinced that those new facts
raised a sufficient doubt about Schlup’s guilt to undermine confidence in the
result of the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error, Schlup’s threshold showing of innocence would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims.147

144.
145.
146.
147.

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317.
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BEACH II

In November of 2013, a district court issued an order that set the stage
for the Montana Supreme Court to either accept or reject the standards proposed in the Beach II concurrence.149 Cody Marble was convicted of sexual
intercourse without consent in November of 2002.150 On December 14,
2010, Marble filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the recantation of the victim, who served as the key witness at his trial.151 As the new
evidence was discovered years after the conviction had become final, Marble brought his claim under Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2).152
The district court subsequently held a hearing on October 12, 2012, during
which the witness recanted his recantation.153 Following the hearing, the
district court determined that “the recantation of [the witness] does not affirmatively, and unquestionably, establish Marble’s innocence,” thereby applying the standards developed within the Beach II concurrence to Marble’s
claim.154
In his order denying Marble’s petition for post-conviction relief, Judge
Harkin noted “the concurring opinion in Beach II made it abundantly clear
that the legal standard to be used to analyze a petition based on [§]
46–21–102(2) . . . should not be based on the five factor Clark test” and
proceeded to adopt, verbatim, the reasoning used by Justice McKinnon.155
In adopting Justice McKinnon’s conclusion, Judge Harkin stated “this court
will apply the substantive/freestanding Herrera analysis to Marble’s Petition for Postconviction Relief.”156 Under this analysis, Marble was required
to “affirmatively and unquestionably” show that the newly discovered evidence established his innocence.157 Even if the arguments presented are not
convincing enough to refute the rejection of the Clark test, the district
court’s application of the proposed standards reveals the more fundamental
problem of requiring a petitioner to “affirmatively and unquestionably” establish his innocence.158
148. On appeal, the author argued a portion of this case before the Montana Supreme Court.
149. Or., Memo., Findings of Fact & Conclusions of L.–Pet. for Postconviction Relief, Marble v.
State, (Mont. 4th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013) (No. DV-10-1670), appeal filed, (Mont. Nov. 15, 2013)
[hereinafter Marble Order].
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 12.
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 16.
155. Marble Order, supra n. 149, at 6–7.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id.
158. Notably, the post-conviction relief petition alleging newly discovered evidence in State v. Marble was timely filed under Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(2).
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To illustrate this point, the Beach I standard was developed to address
a petition that was before the Court twenty-five years after the conviction
became final, under a statute that required, without exception, that petitions
be filed within five years of the conviction becoming final.159 And yet, the
“clear and convincing” standard developed in light of this twenty-five year
lapse is no less strict than the “affirmatively and unquestionably” standard
the concurrence argues should be applied to a claim filed within one year of
the discovery of new evidence. This discussion illustrates the importance of
the temporal placement of a petition: there is no circumstance more prejudicial to the post-conviction relief petition than the passage of time between
the date of filing and the date of the original conviction. And yet, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made it explicitly clear that even “unjustifiable delay”
should not count “as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining whether actual innocence has been reliably shown.”160 Given the
importance of time in the treatment of the post-conviction petition, this article next addresses the four temporal avenues under which a post-conviction
petition may proceed.
V. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETING PETITIONS
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
There are four distinct categories under which a petition may be filed:
within one year of the judgment becoming final (Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–21–102(1)); within one year of the discovery of new evidence that
establishes innocence (Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2)); under
the doctrine of equitable tolling (relating to either of the previous two provisions);161 and outside of the time limit imposed by statute (termed the “miscarriage of justice” exception).162 Because each of these categories warrants
a different standard of review, it is absolutely imperative the reviewing
court correctly determine which category a petition is filed under. This section analyzes each category and proposes the corresponding standards of
review to be plugged into the Crosby test, allowing reviewing courts to
clearly and consistently determine the merits of petitions for post-conviction relief.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Beach I, 220 P.3d at 668–669.
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
See Davis v. State, 187 P.3d 654 (Mont. 2008).
See State v. Redcrow, 980 P.2d 622 (Mont. 1999).
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A. Evaluating a Petition within One Year of the
Judgment becoming Final
Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(1) states “a petition for the relief referred to in [§] 46–21–101 may be filed at any time within [one] year
of the date that the conviction becomes final.” Therefore, if the petitioner
files a petition under § 46–21–102(1) within one year of the conviction becoming final (as defined by statute163), the statute presents no additional
statutory hurdle for him to overcome.
In Herman v. State,164 the Montana Supreme Court addressed a petition brought within one year of conviction. In Herman, the Court upheld the
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of a petition for postconviction relief that alleged newly discovered evidence.165 Importantly,
this is the only avenue under which the reviewing court can dismiss a
§ 46–21–102(1) petition (as stated by Title 46, Chapter 24 of the Montana
Code) without granting an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of
the post-conviction claim.166 The dispositive issue in Herman was the failure of the petitioner to attach documents in the form of “affidavits, records
or other evidence” adequately supporting his claim.167 Citing
§ 46–21–104(1)(c), the Court affirmed the dismissal, stating that a petition
alleging newly discovered evidence must “identify all facts supporting the
grounds for relief set forth in the petition and have attached affidavits,
records, or other evidence establishing the existence of those facts.”168 The
Court stated the standard used to evaluate the evidence contained in the
supporting documents was whether the petitioner had proved “by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to relief,”169 and that the
evidence presented could not constitute mere “allegations.”170 Further, the
Court stated that a district court may dismiss a petition for post-conviction
relief, but only if the petition “conclusively show[s] that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.”171 The Court reaffirmed a preponderance of the evidence
standard for timely post-conviction relief claims in Griffin v. State,172 stating, “A person requesting post-conviction relief has the burden to show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts justify relief.”173
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(1)(a)–(c).
127 P.3d 422 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at 431–432.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–201.
Herman, 127 P.3d at 425–426.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 425 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–201(1)(a)) (emphasis added).
77 P.3d 545 (Mont. 2003).
Id. at 547 (citing State v. Peck, 865 P.2d 304, 305 (Mont. 1993)).
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While Griffin and Herman clearly advocated for such a standard, a
preponderance of the evidence may be too strict to adequately address
claims brought within a year of trial. Going forward, claims brought under
§ 46–21–101(1) should be required to prove only by a “reasonable
probability” that the facts justify the grant of a post-conviction hearing.
This conclusion is supported by four main arguments. First, the temporal
position of a case proceeding under § 46–21–102(1), when a petition is
closest in time to the original conviction, justifies the very low hurdle
presented by a reasonable probability standard. Second, prejudice to the
state can hardly have formed into an insurmountable barrier to defending
the case in such a short period of time. Third, the Court has never held the
passage of up to a single year to be evidence of bad faith. And finally, the
complete lack of an evidentiary standard in § 46–21–102(1) supports the
conclusion that the evidentiary standard used by the courts should be as
lenient as possible.174
Evaluating such a claim under the reasonable probability standard is
not a new or novel idea. In Clark, subsequently adopted by Crosby, the
Court advocated for precisely that standard to be applied, arguing that such
a standard would allow the reviewing court to determine the “weight and
credibility of the new evidence, and to consider what impact, looking prospectively at a new trial with a new jury, this evidence may have on that
new jury.”175
Therefore, when evaluating a petition for post-conviction relief filed
within a year of the conviction becoming final, the reviewing court should
apply the following test:
1. the evidence must have been discovered since the defendant’s trial;
2. the failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the result of a lack
of diligence on the defendant’s part;
3. the evidence must be material to the issues at trial;
4. the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and
5. the evidence must prove, by a reasonable probability, that the facts support
the relief sought.176

174. See Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–101(1).
175. Clark, 125 P.3d at 1106.
176. This test is a reiteration of the Clark test as adopted in Crosby. Here, the petitioner is proceeding within a very short time of the conviction becoming final which warrants the application of a relatively lenient standard of review.
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B. The Newly Discovered Evidence Provision: Evaluating a Petition
within One Year of the Discovery of
New Evidence of Innocence
The treatment of Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102(2), which allows a post-conviction relief petition to proceed within one year of the discovery of new evidence, is the source of most of the confusion and frustration within Montana’s post-conviction relief jurisprudence. The provision
reads, in full:
A claim that alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if
proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the
petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was
convicted, may be raised in a petition filed within 1 year of the date on which
the conviction becomes final or the date on which the petitioner discovers, or
reasonably should have discovered, the existence of the evidence, whichever
is later.177

The meaning of the provision turns on the word “establish.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “establish” as “[t]o prove; to convince.”178 As recognized in Howell v. State,179 the Court has a duty to “interpret individual
sections of an act in such a manner as to ensure coordination with the other
sections of the act.”180 The word “establish” falls under the section entitled
“When petition may be filed,”181 as opposed to the section entitled “Contents of petition.”182 Further, both of these sections are included in Part I of
Chapter 21, entitled “Initiating Proceedings,” while the evaluation of the
petition by the reviewing court is governed by Part II, aptly named “Action
of Court.” Under this rationale, the word “establish” should be interpreted
as presenting a relatively lenient, threshold barrier to the relief sought in the
petition.
Claims proceeding under § 46–21–102(2) should be required to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts justify the relief sought in
the petition. A preponderance of the evidence is not a high standard; a petitioner must only prove that he, “on the whole, has the stronger evidence,
however slight the edge may be.”183 However, this standard is slightly
higher than that which should be applied to petitions proceeding within one
year of the judgment becoming final. The claim’s temporal position, the
mounting prejudice faced by the state, the sheer passage of time, and the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(2) (emphasis added).
Black’s Law Dictionary 664 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., West 2014).
868 P.2d 568 (Mont. 1994).
Howell, 868 P.2d at 575.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102.
Id. at § 46–21–104.
Black’s Law Dictionary, supra n.178 at 1373 (defining “preponderance of the evidence”).
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presence of an evidentiary standard in the statute all support the application
of a heightened standard of review.
Therefore, when evaluating a petition for post-conviction relief proceeding under § 46–21–102(2), the reviewing court should apply the following test:
1. the evidence must have been discovered since the defendant’s trial;
2. the failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the result of a lack
of diligence on the defendant’s part;
3. the evidence must be material to the issues at trial;
4. the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and
5. the evidence must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts
support the relief sought.184

C. Evaluating a Petition Proceeding under the
Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
In 2008, the Montana Supreme Court decided Davis v. State,185 and
held a post-conviction relief petition may prevail on a “motion to toll on
equitable grounds the one-year time bar contained in § 46–21–102.”186 The
Court stated that the question for consideration by the reviewing court was
“whether the failure to toll on equitable grounds would work ‘a clear miscarriage of justice, one so obvious’ that the imposition of the time bar
would compromise the integrity of the judicial process.”187
The U.S. Supreme Court has reached similar conclusions regarding the
applicability of equitable tolling to circumstances almost identical to those
that can arise under the Montana statute. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Holland v. Florida.188 Holland affirmed this third type of innocence claim, which exists where a “petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling.”189 To proceed under Holland, the petition must show “ ‘(1) that [the
petitioner] has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [the petitioner’s] way’ and prevented
timely filing.”190 Equitable tolling, in such circumstances, would entitle the
184. This test is a reiteration of the Clark test, the difference being that the standard contained within
the fifth ‘crux’ element has been modified to appropriately address the temporal position of the petitioner. Here, where a petitioner is proceeding within one of the statutorily recognized avenues for relief,
namely the newly discovered evidence provision codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 46–21–102(2), a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard is appropriate.
185. 187 P.3d 654 (Mont. 2008).
186. Id. at 659.
187. Id. (quoting Redcrow, 980 P.2d at 627).
188. 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
189. Id. at 649.
190. Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
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petitioner to the standard of review applicable to whichever portion of the
statute under which he was attempting to proceed.191
Allowing post-conviction relief petitioners to proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling makes sense. Hypothetically, equitable tolling
would allow a petitioner who files a claim a day after the statute tolls to
avoid being treated the same as a petitioner who has filed his claim twentyfive years after the tolling of such a statute. Importantly, there is a distinction between the standards used to determine whether a petitioner may proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling used by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Holland and the Montana Supreme Court in Davis. Holland only requires
the petitioner to show that diligence and an “extraordinary circumstance”
preventing timely filing.192 However Davis, because of its reliance on the
miscarriage of justice exception, requires a petitioner to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the “integrity of the judicial process” would suffer if the petitioner was not allowed to proceed as a timely filed claim.193 In
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fay, allowing state courts to
be the first arena of appeal,194 an argument exists that the Davis standard is
too strict because it would be easier for the petitioner to seek relief, on an
identical claim, in federal court, than it would be in state court.
Thus, the availability of equitable tolling underscores the problem with
applying the heightened standards proposed by Justice McKinnon in the
Beach II concurrence to timely claims under Montana Code Annotated
§ 46–21–102. Simply put, if there is no distinction between the treatment of
an untimely claim, even one filed twenty-five years late, and a timely claim
(filed under either § 46–21–102(1) or (2)), then why statutorily distinguish
the claims in the first place? A sliding scale of evidentiary review would
alleviate this problem by adequately compensating for the temporal positioning of the petitioner.
D. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception: Evaluating a Petition Filed
Outside of the Statutorily Prescribed Time Limits
Because the statutorily prescribed time limits governing when a petitioner may bring a petition for post-conviction relief are strictly interpreted,195 petitioners frequently attempt to file outside of these temporal
limitations. When evaluating such petitions, referred to as ‘untimely’
191. The most likely scenario would be, as noted, a petitioner would seek to proceed under
§46–21–102(1) instead of the heightened requirement of § 102(2) or under § 102(2) instead of the
heightened requirement found in this miscarriage of justice exception.
192. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649.
193. Davis, 187 P.3d at 659.
194. Fay, 372 U.S. at 418–419.
195. Mont. Code. Ann. § 46–21–102.
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claims, the Montana Supreme Court has consistently looked to guidance
from U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal habeas petitions.196
In State v. Redcrow, the Montana Supreme Court cited Schlup as persuasive
authority when defining the miscarriage of justice exception.197 A few years
later, in State v. Pope, the Court cited both Schlup and Herrera as persuasive authority for providing the definition of the exception in distinct circumstances.198 Notably, in both Schlup and Herrera, the petitioners were
not only proceeding on federal habeas petitions, but were attempting to proceed under the writ for the second time.199 Because the Montana Supreme
Court continues to rely on federal habeas jurisprudence,200 U.S. Supreme
Court decisions provide the most persuasive precedent for practitioners who
are seeking to challenge a conviction after the statutorily allowed time period. This section briefly addresses the most relevant U.S. Supreme Court
case regarding this issue.
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McQuiggin v. Perkins, and
specifically addressed the following issue: “[I]f the petitioner does not file
her federal habeas petition, at the latest, within one year of ‘the date on
which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,’ can the time bar be
overcome by a convincing showing that she committed no crime?”201 The
Court held a showing of “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway
through which a petitioner may pass.”202 Prior to McQuiggin, at least in the
realm of federal habeas, the Court had only allowed a showing of actual
innocence to overcome “judge-made . . . barriers to relief.”203 The rationale,
as noted by Justice Scalia who dissented in McQuiggin, was that a judicially
created barrier to relief, such as the procedural bar in petitions for postconviction relief, was fittingly overcome by a judicially created exception
to the barrier.204 McQuiggin’s expansion of the scope of the miscarriage of
justice exception to include statutorily created barriers to relief is rational.
By widening the scope, the Court recognized that the U.S. Constitution provides a fundamental protection to the person that federal or state statutes
196. See Redcrow, 980 P.2d at 626–627 (citing as persuasive authority Schlup, 513 U.S. at 301
(involving a petitioner proceeding on a “second federal habeas corpus petition”)); Pope, 80 P.3d at 1239
(citing as persuasive authority Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393 (involving a petitioner proceeding on a “second
federal habeas petition”)).
197. Redcrow, 980 P.2d at 626–627.
198. Pope, 80 P.3d at 1238–1240.
199. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 301; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393.
200. See generally Pope, 80 P.3d 1232; Redcrow, 980 P.2d 622; Beach I, 220 P.3d 667; Beach II,
302 P.3d 47.
201. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1937 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1937–1938.
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cannot remove. The Court clearly reiterated the standard to be applied in
such a case: “ ‘A petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless
he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror,
acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”205 Further, the Court illustrated the proper way in which to address
the passage of time between the original proceeding and the filing of the
petition when it stated, “[I]n making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, ‘the time of the [petition]’ is a factor bearing on the ‘reliability of
th[e] evidence’ purporting to show actual innocence.”206
In light of the Montana Supreme Court’s penchant for applying federal
habeas jurisprudence to petitions for post-conviction relief,207 and especially considering how similar the issue in the case is to the issues created
by the statutory construction of Montana Code Annotated § 46–21–102, it
would be worthwhile to consider whether the Court has been correctly applying federal habeas precedent. Schlup and Herrera, the two federal
habeas cases most consistently cited by the Court, are outdated, and if the
Court chooses to continue to rely on that line of precedent, McQuiggin provides the most persuasive precedent.
Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin, when a reviewing court is evaluating an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, it
should apply the following test:
1. the evidence must have been discovered since the defendant’s trial;
2. the failure to discover the evidence sooner must not be the result of a lack
of diligence on the defendant’s part;
3. the evidence must be material to the issues at trial;
4. the evidence must be neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and
5. the evidence must prove, clearly and convincingly, that the facts justify the
relief sought.208

VI. CONCLUSION
The inflammatory nature of the issue underlying post-conviction relief,
that a person may be convicted of a crime he did not commit, has propelled
this area of law into the local and national spotlight.209 At its core, postconviction relief recognizes that as long as the judicial system is adminis205. Id. at 1928 (majority) (emphasis added) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).
206. Id. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332).
207. See generally Pope, 80 P.3d 1232; Redcrow, 980 P.2d 622; Beach I, 220 P.3d 667; Beach II,
302 P.3d 47.
208. This test is a reiteration of the Clark test, the difference being that the standard contained within
the fifth ‘crux’ element has been modified to appropriately address the temporal position of the petitioner. Here, where a petitioner is proceeding outside of the statutorily recognized avenues for relief, the
heightened ‘clear and convincing’ standard is appropriate.
209. At the national level the public’s growing infatuation with post-conviction relief is best illustrated by the whirlwind media storm surrounding the case of Adnan Syed by the Serial podcast. (See
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tered by the human mind there will be errors. As former Montana Supreme
Court Justice Brian Morris recently noted, “Humans, by nature, are fallible
and the processes that humans create share this same fallibility.”210 This
fallibility emphasizes the humanity of the law. Such humanity should not be
feared, but to fully understand our justice system it must not be ignored. In
that light, the exceptional case of one who is innocent of the crime charged
exists, and the interests of justice require that it not be ignored.
The language of the statutes in Title 46, Chapter 21, Part 1, of the
Montana Code Annotated is ground zero for the current issues in post-conviction relief. The clarity within post-conviction relief jurisprudence that
existed when Crosby was decided occurred in spite of, rather than because
of, the governing statutory language. Going forward, a top down revision of
Title 46, Chapter 21 of the Montana Code is the most effective way to
clarify post-conviction relief jurisprudence in Montana.
However, until the Legislature revisits the statute, the Court should
endeavor to evaluate petitions for newly discovered evidence in the clearest,
most consistent way possible. In that regard, a one-size-fits-all approach to
newly discovered evidence is inadequate. As Part V of this article illustrates, there are various temporal avenues under which a post-conviction
relief petitioner may proceed. In the interests of justice, the petitioner who
timely files within the statutorily prescribed time period should not be
treated the same as the petitioner who files years after the statute has tolled.
A failure to revisit the standards proposed by Justice McKinnon in
Beach II will likely result in an exodus of post-conviction relief claims to
the federal courts. Historically, the federal courts have been reluctant to
interfere with a state’s “application of its own firmly established, consistently followed, constitutionally proper procedural rules.”211 Meaning, the
federal courts would view a procedural default under a state law as resting
upon “independent and adequate state ground[s].”212 Were the federal
courts to remain so reluctant, Montana would likely be allowed to stay the
current course and adopt strict standards of review in post-conviction relief
cases. There is, however, a sea change on the horizon.
In Martinez v. Ryan,213 decided in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
opened up a long sealed door to federal habeas review when it held:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must
be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will
not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
Sarah Koenig, Serial: Season One (WBEZ Chicago, Podcast, May 31, 2015), http://serialpodcast.org/).
In Montana, the story of Barry Beach, addressed in this article, has played a similar role.
210. Beach II, 302 P.3d at 87 (Morris, Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).
211. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013).
212. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–730 (1991).
213. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
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assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no
counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.214

Martinez signaled the willingness of the federal courts to become more involved in assuring the protection of the post-conviction relief petitioner’s
constitutional rights. This willingness was re-emphasized in Trevino v. Thaler,215 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013. In Trevino, the Court
held: “[W]here, as here, state procedural framework, by reason of its design
and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant
will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel on direct appeal, our holding in Martinez applies.”216
In summary, McQuiggin, Holland, Martinez, and Trevino, all cases
guaranteeing additional protections to the petitioner seeking to challenge
the validity of his sentence, have been decided within the last five years.
While Martinez or Trevino may not have a dramatic impact on proceedings
in Montana, this underlying current should give the courts and practitioners
reason for pause. Arguably, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to ensure that meaningful opportunities exist for those attempting to
challenge their convictions based on a violation of the protections afforded
by the U.S. Constitution. Such a meaningful opportunity does not exist
when a state court applies more stringent standards of evidentiary review
than those a petitioner would be subject to in federal court. Therefore, the
Montana Supreme Court should consider rejecting a one-size-fits-all standard in favor of a sliding scale of evidentiary review to balance the various
concerns for both the petitioners and the state, while keeping Montana in
line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.

214. Id. at 1320.
215. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
216. Id. at 1921.
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